

Product Assurance and Safety Approach to New Space in ESA Projects

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ESA-TECQQM-HO-2024-001195 is. 1

Workshop “L’impegno italiano nel settore dei CubeSat: tecnologie e missioni future” – 2° edizione
July 2024

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- ECSS vs. Mission Complexity and Risk
- Product Assurance & Safety – Key Requirements
- New Space
- How to use the ECSS in the frame of New Space?
- Product Assurance & Safety Approach with ESA Mission Classification Scheme
- Integration of CubeSat Guidelines into ESA Mission Classification Scheme
- Support Tool: ESA TRL Calculator
- Conclusions & Take-Aways
- Q&A
- Bibliography and Backup slides

ECSS vs. Complexity and Risk




Fig.1: Example of number of ECSS requirements applicable in Different Missions

Adapted from TEC-QES (ESA Requirements and Standards Section) exhibit

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- The diagram consists of six horizontal bars, each representing a different ECSS-Q-ST standard. Each bar is a different color and contains two lines of text: a bolded title and a standard number. The bars are arranged vertically, with the top bar being light gray and the bottom bar being yellow. The bars are connected by a vertical line on the left side, which is labeled 'ECSS-Q-ST-10 and 20'.
- | Standard | Category |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| ECSS-Q-ST-10 and 20 | PA/QA |
| ECSS-Q-ST-30 | Dependability |
| ECSS-Q-ST-40 | Safety |
| ECSS-Q-ST-60 | EEE components |
| ECSS-Q-ST-70 | Materials, mech. parts, processes |
| ECSS-Q-ST-80 | Software PA |

With respect to a mission there are a few key differences:

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How to use the ECSS in the frame of New Space?



How *deep* do we need to go in order to **gain confidence** that our Processes, Materials, EEE, etc are **reliable** enough to be used in our New Space missions, without using the **complete ECSS**?

The answer is given by the **ESA Mission Classification (EMC) Scheme** (ECSS Pre-Tailored requirements for ESA missions)

- The EMC encompasses one-off missions, recurring operational spacecrafts, IOD/IOV and CubeSats
- Satellite mega-constellations and launchers are **not addressed**
- **More flexibility** is given to Industry as a function of class of the mission (highest flexibility and associated risk for class Delta), but also more reliance of ESA on contractor's internal processes, more simplification of the documentation and required reporting, at the cost of the less visibility given to ESA and more delegation of responsibility and of risk is given to industry
- The EMC is supported, when needed, by the **ESA TRL Calculator** [10] to properly assess the maturity of the technology when under development up to qualification, isolating gaps in design and test/validation by means of checklists.

PA Approach – ESA Mission Classification [2/2]



In the updated ESA Mission Classification Scheme 4 different mission classes have been identified

| Mission Characteristics Criteria & Related Weighting Factors | | Class Level | | | | Input Score (1/2/3/4) | Weighted Score | | | |
|--|----|---|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------|---|-------|-----------------------------|
| | | Alpha | Beta | Gamma | Delta | | | | | |
| Acceptable Risk Risk of mission failure which is agreed acceptable to management | | LOW  HIGH | | | | | | | | |
| Criticality to Agency Strategy Flagship mission, international co-operation, impact of strategic ESA goals and image. | | Extremely Critical | Highly Critical | Medium Criticality | Low Criticality | | | | | |
| WF (10/20/30 %): | 20 | | x | | | 2 | 0.40 |  | | |
| Mission Objectives Directorate priority and purpose e.g. In orbit demonstration, educational. | | Top Priority | High Priority | Medium Priority | Low Priority | | | | | |
| WF (10/20/30 %): | 20 | | x | | | 2 | 0.40 |  | | |
| Cost Cost at completion inc. Phase E1 | | > 400 M€ | 200 - 400 M€ | 25 – 200 M€ | < 25 M€ | | | | | |
| WF (10/20/30 %): | 20 | | | | x | 4 | 0.80 |  | | |
| Mission Lifetime Nominal mission life duration | | > 7 years | 5 -7 years | 2-5 years | < 2 years | | | | | |
| WF (10/20/30 %): | 20 | | x | | | 2 | 0.40 |  | | |
| Mission complexity Design interfaces, unique payloads, new technology development. | | Extremely Complex | Highly Complex | Medium Complexity | Low Complexity | | | | | |
| WF (10/20/30 %): | 20 | | | | x | 4 | 0.80 |  | | |
| Total % (must be 100): | | 100 | | | | | | Total (*): | 2.80 | |
| | | | | | | | | CLASS: | Gamma | <<< Resulting Mission Class |

WF: Weighting Factor (10, 20, 30)

>>> Use pull-down menu to select value

| Class | Mass [Kg] |
|-------|-----------|
| Pico | < 1 |
| Nano | 1 – 10 |
| Micro | 10 – 100 |
| Mini | 100 – 500 |



Integration of ESA IOD Cubesats Requirements in the ESA MC

EEE components and Radiation Harness Assurance (RHA)

- Baseline is EEE COTS. ESA COTS guidelines (8) may be used as a reference
- In case data is not available, Rad Test should be performed, generally at board/module level
- Reduced Declared Component List (DCL) is **mandatory** to keep track of components being used
- Perform burn-in testing @ board level for a duration of 168 hrs at max. acceptable equipm. temperature

Materials & Processes

- Reduced Material, Process and Mechanical Part Lists are **mandatory** including basic information like outgassing data, quantity of material, evidence of previous space usage
- Pure tin removal might be worse than living with it, given the short mission duration
- Assembly: Class 3 IPC certificate for soldering is required
- Cleanliness: Visibly clean is generally acceptable


Software

- The approach is to abide by recognised coding standards, to perform unit testing, measure code coverage
- Minimum amount of SW documentation that needs to be provided to properly design, verify and validate SW



Support tool: ESA TRL Calculator [1/2]

ESA TRL Calculator is available to Industry (<https://trlcalculator.esa.int>). It embeds path-to-flight approach for Design, AIV/AIT, PA, M&P, EEE, SW, RAMS, Management



Welcome to the TRL Calculator (Version 2.0)




- ✓ The ESA TRL calculator is an aid to assess the maturity level of a technology. The tool is aligned with the ECSS standards.
- ✓ This tool covers TRL 3 to TRL 7 for Equipment, Materials and Processes, EEE components and Software.
- ✓ Main users of the tool are Technical Officers, Project Managers and PA managers.
- ✓ This tool is currently a beta-version. It is under the control of TEC-QQM section in ESA.
- ✓ For any feedback or queries on the scope and contents of the tool please contact Lorenzo Marchetti. For contact: Contact_TRL_Calculator@esa.int

TEMPLATES EASILY
AVAILABLE

CHECKLIST AVAILABLE
FOR EACH TRL

| ID ↑ | Question | Mandatory | Category | Subcategory | Answer | Cor |
|------|---|-----------|-----------|-------------|--------|-----|
| 1 | Are the critical functions identified? | True | Design | | Yes | |
| 2 | Is the relevant environment identified? | True | Design | | Yes | |
| 3 | Is there a breadboard available? | True | AIV - AIT | | Yes | |
| 4 | In case sub-elements have different TRL maturities, the verification at BB level aims to verify that the overall TRL 5 is achieved. The different maturity levels should be documented in the DDV plan or equivalent. This question becomes crucial for complex instruments that are assembled from parts that are coming from different suppliers who have different visions on assessing the technology maturity. | True | Design | | Yes | |
| 5 | Are analytical models to predict (e.g. scaling)? | True | Design | | Yes | |
| 6 | Have analyses and test reports show evidence that the sub-elements work together as expected? | True | AIV - AIT | | N/A | |
| 7 | Is failure propagation addressed in the design for safety | | | | | |




SPIDER CHART FOR EACH AREA
AND FOR DIFFERENT MILESTONES

<https://trlcalculator.esa.int>

Support tool: ESA TRL Calculator [2/2]

- The use of the ESA TRL calculator defines **what is needed** to achieve a specific level of technology maturity, since the early inception of a contract until the delivery
- The tool helps the Project Team to monitor the progress of the activity in all engineering and **PA/QA areas**, across the complete development and qualification lifecycle
- The tool comes with a **set of templates**, ready for use
- The tool supports industry, especially newcomers to space business, SMEs, Academia and Research Institutes on the information to be provided for achieving a target TRL
- It matches the **New Space** needs as it focuses on the **DOCUMENTED INFORMATION** to be provided, not strictly on a standard, whilst keeping the ECSS “attitude” on what is needed to gain confidence that a “quality product” is delivered
- It is a valuable tool to “**educate**” space newcomers on how a space business activity should be carried out with the support of the Agency
- ESA runs **two Training Sessions** per year on TRL for Industry under the ESA Learning Hub




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Backup Slides

Figure 4. Cost of Parts with Upgrading Testing Costs Added to the Procurement Costs



Source: Cost Impacts of Upgrading Electronic Parts for Use in NASA Space Flight Systems (NASA)


Take-away: upgraded parts are always more expensive than level-ready parts


| Procurement and Approval | Remarks |
|--|---|
| <p>Quality Baseline is ECSS (ST-Q-60) Class 3 type of EEE Components, with further relaxations.</p> <p>These requirements are to be applied to equipment deemed as critical for the success of the mission</p> | <p>Class 3 EEE Components has the lowest procurement cost, lowest assurance and highest risk among the three classes. Note: The ECSS has its own classification which is different from the MIL-STD.</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The supplier is NOT responsible for manufacturer surveillance Screening is NOT applied to ALL components Screening is NOT performed by a certified entity (ex: ESCC) In case of screening, less stringent requirements apply. For example, on oscillators, chip inductors, wires Lot Acceptance Testing is NOT required for Class 3. It is only required for COTS Pre-cap and Buy-off inspections are NOT required A Program Status of Compliance [SoC] to the Q60 is NOT required A Parts Control Board [PCB] is NOT required A Declared Part List [DCL] is STILL required Control over non-hermetically sealed materials of components is mandatory Use of pure tin inside or outside the part is to be declared in the PAD ← it is up to the project, in any case, to define the specific policy, based on risk assessment | <p>Space qualified means that the component belongs to a Qualified Parts List [QPL] or a Qualified Manufacturers List [QML] that are recognised by a third-party organization (e.g. ESCC, MIL, NASA, JAXA)</p> <hr/> <p>Pure Tin refers to a content of tin (Sn) inside the alloy of the component higher than 97% of the mass. For soldering applications, in general it is 93% minimum. Please always check against the standards!</p> <hr/> <p>A PAD is a control document that identifies the component and provides info about its acceptability vs. procurement specs, Lot Acceptance Test [LAT], Radiation Verification Tests [RVT], etc.</p> <hr/> |

A dive into EEE COTS components for Gamma missions

| Procurement and Approval | Remarks |
|---|---|
| <p>The ECSS COTS standard aims to raise the assurance for COTS components to the same level of one of the previous three space grade Classes.</p> <p>Consequently, for Class IV mission, COTS Class 3 requirements apply.</p> | <p>COTS EEE: commercial electronic component, procured from the market, readily available and not manufactured, inspected or tested in accordance with military or space standards.</p> |
| <p>A key piece of information for COTS is the trace code, to guarantee lot homogeneity among procured COTS.</p> <p>The assessment of commercial components is done through JD, and evaluation plan is to be approved by the Customer.</p> <p><i>Strong relaxation:</i> for COTS, there is no minimum content to be included in the Justification Document, but Customer's approval is needed. In addition, JDs for multiple components can be combined.</p> | <p>Trace Code: identifier used by a manufacturer to label and trace a quantity of components with AT LEAST a common assembly history.</p> <p><u>A Justification Document for an OTS is akin to what a Part Approval Document is for a Space grade component.</u></p> |
| <p>Destructive Physical Analysis can be waived for AECQ-100 and AECQ-200 components, in general</p> | |

| Policy for derating | Remarks |
|---|--|
| The baseline policy for derating EEE and COTS components is to be in accordance with the ECSS → no exceptions | Derating: to design a product to limit the component stresses below their ratings, to increase product's reliability Rating: max parameter value specified and guaranteed by the manufacturer, not to be exceeded during operations [e.g. current, voltage, power, temperature] |
| The rules of ECSS derating apply to steady state, surge and transient conditions | Surge: strong rush or sweep Transient: brief change in the state of a system |
| Part Stress Analysis [PSA] is mandatory | The PSA could be a heavy document, and the contractor needs to be aware |
| In case of components sensitive to radiation , then ECSS RHA requirements apply | Limits on current and voltages to get a proper Radiation Design Margin [RDM] imposed by RHA might be more severe than ordinary deratings. |





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A dive into RHA for Gamma missions

| Radiation Verification Testing [RVT] | Remarks |
|--|--|
| A Radiation Hardness Assurance [RHA] Program is mandatory for radiation sensitive components | RHA is a systematic process of ensuring that EEE components can operate reliably in the presence of ionising and non-ionising radiation |
| The RHA Program is project specific, and orbit related RHA can be split into TID RHA, TNID RHA, SEE RHA. For LEO missions, RDM > 1 in general and to be submitted to Customer for approval, if not otherwise defined. | TIDL Calculated Total Ionising dose Level received by the part at the end of the mission. Rad-hard components are generically the ones that can withstand high TIDL. RDM , is radiation design margin; conceptually, it is analogue to derating , i.e. it introduces a design safety margin vs. the max dose that a component can absorb before it exceeds its functional requirements. |
| In case of lack of data for Class 3 EEE components, the approval and execution of the RVT is subject to Customer's approval. | RVT is Radiation Verification Testing |
| When components or units come with no info on RHA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If TIDL less than 5 krad, no test is needed • If TIDL higher than 5 krad, RVT can be carried out at board level • In case of potential sensitivity to SEE, proton testing is needed | Proton testing can be performed at board/module level. |

It might be difficult to get evidence that the tested board includes components having the same **lot homogeneity** as the flight ones → if no RHA data is available, the same flight **procurement lot** can be tested on ground (best effort strategy).

A dive into RAM for Gamma missions

| Dependability | Remarks |
|--|---|
| A Dependability Assurance Plan is not needed, but the dependability critical items criteria are to be defined in any case | The critical items are recorded in the CIL (Critical Item List) – the content of the CIL is defined by the Project. |
| Failure tolerance is not mandatory: relevant requirements can be tailored by the Project | For a Cubesat, single-point failure (SPF) is in general accepted |
| Severity categories (Catastrophic/Critical/Major/Minor) are the standard ones | |
| The Classification of critical functions (I, II, III and IV) is the standard one | |
| Reliability heavily relies on heritage and proven design rules | |
| The SW criticality follows the usual rules for SW (typically Cat B, C and D) | |
| FMEA & HSIA [reduced] WCA [reduced] FDIR analysis mandatory | FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis HSIA: Hardware and Software Interaction Analysis WCA: Worst-Case Analysis FDIR: Failure Detection, Isolation and Recovery |
| FTA not mandatory Zonal Analysis not mandatory | FTA: Fault Tree Analysis |

Reliability figures/analyses @Payload level are generally not REQUIRED; @Platform Level, they might be required to support **Space Debris Mitigation** requirements (SDM)